Political Participation and Power Relations in Egypt: The Scope of Newspapers and Social Network Sites by Shehata, Mostafa
www.ssoar.info
Political Participation and Power Relations in
Egypt: The Scope of Newspapers and Social
Network Sites
Shehata, Mostafa
Veröffentlichungsversion / Published Version
Zeitschriftenartikel / journal article
Empfohlene Zitierung / Suggested Citation:
Shehata, M. (2017). Political Participation and Power Relations in Egypt: The Scope of Newspapers and Social
Network Sites. Media and Communication, 5(2), 53-63. https://doi.org/10.17645/mac.v5i2.898
Nutzungsbedingungen:
Dieser Text wird unter einer CC BY Lizenz (Namensnennung) zur
Verfügung gestellt. Nähere Auskünfte zu den CC-Lizenzen finden
Sie hier:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/deed.de
Terms of use:
This document is made available under a CC BY Licence
(Attribution). For more Information see:
https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0
Media and Communication (ISSN: 2183–2439)
2017, Volume 5, Issue 2, Pages 53–63
DOI: 10.17645/mac.v5i2.898
Article
Political Participation and Power Relations in Egypt: The Scope of
Newspapers and Social Network Sites
Mostafa Shehata
Department of Communication and Arts, Roskilde University, 4000 Roskilde, Denmark; E-Mail: shehata@ruc.dk
Submitted: 31 January 2017 | Accepted: 27 March 2017 | Published: 8 May 2017
Abstract
The political use ofmedia in Egypt post-2011 revolution brought about drastic transformations in political activism and power
structures. In the context of communication power theory, this article investigates the effects of newspapers and social net-
work sites on political participation and political power relations. The research employed a mixed methodology, comprised
of a survey of 527 Egyptian youth and semi-structured interviews of 12 political activists and journalists. The results showed
a significant relationship between reading newspapers and youth’s political participation, but not between using social net-
work sites and political participation. In addition, newspapers and social network sites were platforms for a series of conflicts
and coalitions that emerged between pro- and anti-revolution actors. Despite the importance of social network sites as key
tools for informing and mobilizing the public, they eventually failed to empower new political actors, and this was because
old actors, supported by newspapers and other mainstream media, managed to obstruct the new actors’ progress.
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1. Introduction
The authoritarian nature of Mubarak’s rule in Egypt sub-
stantially obstructed Egyptian youth’s political partici-
pation (PP) for decades. In the last two parliamentary
elections under his rule (held in 2005 and 2010), voter
turnout did not exceed 23% and 15% respectively (Sika,
2012, p. 138). In contrast, youth protest activities con-
siderably increased in the final years of his reign, cul-
minating in the January 2011 revolution (25J) that man-
aged to topple him on February 11th of the same year. In
the wake of the revolution, Egyptians started to actively
participate in politics in different respects. For example,
voter turnout in the 2011 referendum and parliamentary
election comprised 41% and 60% respectively (Abd Al-
samad, 2014, paras. 2–4). However, PP was once again
obstructed when the army seized power after ousting
the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) affiliated president Mo-
hamed Morsi on July 3rd, 2013. This obstruction was
characterizedmainly by repression of the revolution’s ad-
vocates, in return for reinforcing its opponents (Khalifa,
2015, p. 216).
In addition to the rapid transformation of PP post-
25J, the Egyptian political scene also witnessed a related
transformation in the power structure of political actors.
The fall of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party in the
wake of the revolution allowed for the emergence and
rise of pro-revolution actors, such as revolutionary youth
and the MB (Mason, 2013; Meier, 2011). Since that time,
these actors have mostly collided with anti-revolution
actors such as the army and remnants of the Mubarak
regime. Consequently, a series of conflicts and coalitions
have emerged between all these actors, and these have
thwarted chances for a democratic transition.
In the midst of post-revolution political changes,
Egyptian newspapers (both offline and online) and so-
cial network sites (SNS) have played a significant role in
effecting changes in PP and power structures. On the
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one hand, the overall attitudes of newspapers toward
the revolution’s outcomes have substantially fluctuated
(AlMaskati, 2012; Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012). In general, it
can be said that newspapers, which have mostly been
controlled by anti-revolution actors, have opposed the
25J, especially since July 3rd, 2013 (El-Adawy, 2014; Roll,
2014). On the other hand, SNS have largely been used by
pro-revolution actors, both during and after 25J, as key
mobilization platforms (Khamis, Gold, & Vaughn, 2012).
For this reason, several scholars have considered SNS in-
fluential tools for changing societies (e.g. Aouragh, 2012;
Aouragh & Alexander, 2012; ElNawawy & Khamis, 2012).
In order not to overestimate their political effect, we can
initially say that SNS have represented alternative plat-
forms that have disclosed what traditional media have
concealed (Abdulla, 2014, p. 1).
This article raises the question of how newspapers
and SNS might have affected youth’s PP and empow-
ered revolutionary youth (as an emerging political actor)
amidst other political actors following 25J. The first part
of this two-sided question is addressed quantitatively,
based on the definition of PP as the “activity that has
the intent or effect of influencing government action—
either directly by affecting the making or implementa-
tion of public policy or indirectly by influencing the selec-
tion of people who make those policies” (Verba, Schloz-
man, & Brady, 2002, p. 38). In this respect, PP is exam-
ined through the various kinds of political activities in
which youth participated, such as voting, protesting, vol-
unteering, and donating.
The second part of the research question, which fo-
cuses on the role of media in the power relations of polit-
ical actors, is addressed qualitatively in the context of the
theory of communication power. Conceptually, Manuel
Castells (2009) defines power as: “the relational capacity
that enables a social actor to influence asymmetrically
the decisions of other social actor(s) in ways that favor
the empowered actor’s will, interests, and values” (p. 10).
He also theorizes the relation betweenmedia and power
by arguing that “power is primarily exercised by the con-
struction of meaning in the human mind through pro-
cesses of communication enacted in global/local multi-
media networks of mass communication, including mass
self-communication” (Castells, 2009, p. 416). In this con-
text, this article investigates the nature of political rela-
tions betweenmajor political actors and the potential ef-
fects of newspapers and SNS in that regard. Hence, I ar-
gue that SNS cannot, in the long run, empower new po-
litical actor(s) especially if newspapers and other main-
stream media are under the control of old actor(s).
2. Literature Review
2.1. Newspapers and Political Participation
The Egyptian newspaper landscape includes three major
types: government-owned newspapers, which are loyal
to the government; partisan newspapers, which enjoy
some freedom in their handling of the government; and
private newspapers, which are more free and profes-
sional (Allam, 2010, paras. 5–8). However, it is impor-
tant tomention that the freedom of each type, which im-
proved in the wake of the 25J, has considerably declined
since July 3rd, 2013. Since this date, all newspapers have
adopted and adhered to the country’s official ideology
(Abdulla, 2014, pp. 11–27).
The literature of PP has largely investigated whether
reading newspapers relates to youth’s PP. In this con-
text, some studies have found no significant relation-
ship between these variables (e.g. Gorsche, 2002; Wang,
2002; Wright-Phillips, 2010), while others have found a
significant relationship between them (e.g. Bakker & De
Vreese, 2011; Fawzy, 2008; Moeller, De Vreese, Esser,
& Kunz, 2014; Shehata, 2010). Unexpectedly, findings
of a relationship between newspapers and PP prove
that newspapers are still able to affect youth, although
youth have primarily become more interested in using
SNS. Linking these results to the Egyptian case in the
current study, we should expect the opposite results,
as a large proportion of Egyptians have lost confidence
in newspapers, which have become biased and loyal to
the government.
With respect to newspapers’ coverage of PP activ-
ities, a number of studies have found that Egyptian
newspapers, in general, adopt negative attitudes to-
ward protestors and participation (e.g. AlMaskati, 2012;
Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012; Ibrahim, 2012; Youssef, 2012).
The main exception to this is provided by Khamis (2011,
pp. 1161–1162), who found that private newspapers
kept people informed about negativities and protest ac-
tivities, both before and during 25J. In general, the poli-
cies of Egyptian newspapers have changed several times,
perhaps as a result of the four power transitions that
have occurred over the last six years. In order to holis-
tically understand the conditions of these changes, this
article highlights the relationship between newspapers
and political actors, which is expected to be a significant
factor behind such changes.
2.2. Social Network Sites and Political Participation
Overall, SNS have provided Egyptian youth with a real
opportunity to express themselves politically. SNS have
also compensated for youth’s absence from mainstream
media, which have been inaccessible to them (Howard
& Hussain, 2013, pp. 4–5). However, the political role
of SNS in Egypt has been affected by government cen-
sorship, especially in the last three years. As SNS are
no longer free in Egypt (as they were previously, in the
wake of Mubarak’s ouster), it is important to investigate
the impacts of SNS censorship on PP and revolutionary
youth’s power.
With respect to the relationship between using SNS
and PP, the literature has produced three different find-
ings: (1) SNS play a key role in PP forms (e.g. Holt,
Shehata, Strömbäck, & Ljungberg, 2013; Kamel, 2014;
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Khamis & Vaughn, 2011; Meier, 2011; Rice, Moffett, &
Madupalli, 2012; Schuster, 2013; Valenzuela, 2013); (2)
the relationship is contingent upon a number of inter-
vening variables, such as social and cultural background
(Groshek, 2008), old media consumption (Budak, 2010),
face-to-face communication (Vissers, Hooghe, Stolle, &
Mahéo, 2012), membership in interest organizations
(Gustafsson, 2012), dissatisfaction with the government
(Harrebye & Ejrnæs, 2015), and socioeconomic status
(Oser, Hooghe, & Marien, 2013); and (3) the relation-
ship is doubtful (Dimitrova & Bystrom, 2013; Schlozman,
Verba, & Brady, 2010).
As a result of the Arab Spring (AS) and similar move-
ments in other countries, assessment of the effects of
SNS onPP andpower structures in the last years has been
very optimistic. However, some very recent writings (e.g.
Fenton, 2016) on this subject have re-assessed the ef-
fects of SNS in the light of the obstacles of the demo-
cratic transition in AS countries. Accordingly, in this ar-
ticle, SNS are handled as neither a main reason for PP
nor a main source of empowerment for political actors.
Rather, they are handled as platforms for participation
and power relations, and the doubts raised about their
effects are also considered.
2.3. Power Relations and Network Society
In his theory of communication power, Castells (2009)
describes mass communication and Internet-based com-
munication as processes through which power can be
practiced, and he considers power, itself, as relations be-
tween different actors. In this context, Howard (2010,
p. 12) claimed that technology can provide political
actors new capacities and restrictions, but it cannot
achieve political change. This claim was empirically sup-
ported by Meier (2011), who found that communication
technology threatened the political regime in Egypt and
shifted the balance of power in favor of civil society. How-
ever, it should be noted that the rise of civil society (in-
cluding revolutionary youth) in Egypt did not last beyond
June 2013; since that time, old actors have resurged. This
article will further explain the conditions of this setback
and the effects of newspapers and SNS in that regard.
The landscape of political actors in Egypt post-25J has
diversified, according to El-Adawy (2014), into three ma-
jor categories: formal institutions, informal societal ac-
tors, and executive authority. The latter has depended,
as described by Roll (2014), upon three further main ac-
tors: Arab Gulf countries, the army, and the country’s
business figures. Among these actors, three major politi-
cal coalitions were, as noted by El-Dine (2014), formed
post-25J: (1) the army and the MB; (2) the army and
the National Salvation Front, which were formed against
the MB; and (3) the army, the business elite, the Salafist
Nour party (the Light), and secular forces. In my opinion,
a separation of formal institutions, executive authority,
and the army, as suggested by El-Adawy (2014) and Roll
(2014), does not apply to the Egyptian case, because the
army has had the upper hand over all other institutions,
including the government. Thus, in this article, the army
will be handled as a major actor alongside the MB and
revolutionary youth.
With respect to the relationship between the me-
dia and political actors, El-Adawy (2014) and Roll (2014)
found thatmedia outlets joined political forces to encour-
age people to demonstrate on June 30th, 2013 against
the ousted president Morsi. In a similar context, Khamis
et al. (2012) found that political activists used online and
offline activism in their conflict with the post-Mubarak
regime, which used both state-owned and social me-
dia. These results prove Castells’ claim about the im-
portance of communication networks for political power
and counter-power (Castells, 2011, p. 783). They also
raise the issue, which this article discusses, of the differ-
ence between the effects produced by traditional media
versus those produced by new media on political actors,
and the limitations of these effects.
3. Methodology
The empirical data of this study were collected through
a mixed-method approach combining survey and semi-
structured interviews using a convergent parallel design.
Based on this approach, first, quantitative and qualita-
tive data were collected concurrently to complement
each other; later, the data were separately analyzed; and
finally, points of analysis were synthesized to achieve
the purpose of the study (Creswell & Plano Clark, 2011,
pp. 77–81).
3.1. Survey
The survey was based on a face-to-face questionnaire
(Foreman, 1991; Wimmer & Dominick, 2011) that was
conducted in September and October 2015. The sample
included 527 Egyptians aged 18 to 35. Only 400 question-
naires were used for a statistical analysis using the Sta-
tistical Package for Social Sciences, version 23 for Mac-
intosh. The sample size was calculated by two methods
described by Israel (1992, pp. 3–4), based on which the
number of respondents was determined.
The respondents were chosen deliberately after us-
ing a proportional allocation considering gender (51%
male and 49% female) and place of residence (57.75%
from Cairo, 24.50% from Menoufia and 17.75% from
Beni Suef). These governorateswere specifically selected
to represent three geographical and cultural aspects in
Egypt.While Cairo is the capital and includesmore urban
and culturally modern inhabitants, Menoufia represents
the northern part of the country, which is slightly cultur-
ally conservative, and Beni Suef represents the southern
part of the country, which is more conservative. It is also
noteworthy that a pre-test was applied in order to en-
hance the validity and relevance of the questionnaire.
In addition, the quantitative phase of this article de-
veloped three scales: newspaper readership, SNS expo-
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sure, and political participation. The first scale, newspa-
per readership,wasmodified from the scale described by
Williams (2008, p. 163), which included two items: online
and offline reading of eight of the most common Egyp-
tian newspapers. In both items, each newspaper was
rated on a four-point response format, where 0 = do not
read it, 0.25 = read it a few times a year, 0.5 = once a
month, 1 = a few times a month, 2 = once a week, 3 = a
few times a week, and 4 = daily or approximately daily.
Thus, the range of the total score was from 0.25 to 72.
Respondents were classified into three categories on the
basis of their scores (s): low reading (s < 6), moderate
reading (6 ≤ s ≤ 11), and high reading (s > 11). Cron-
bach’s 𝛼 coefficient, which was adopted to test the inter-
nal consistency of the scale, was 0.727.
The second scale, SNS exposure, was modified from
the commonly used scale of Ellison, Steinfield and Lampe
(2007, p. 1150), and included three items. (1) The
time consumed using three SNS (Facebook, Twitter and
YouTube): this item was rated on a three-point response
format for eachwebsite, where 0 = no time at all, 1= less
than 30 minutes, 1.5 = 30–59 minutes, 2 = 1 hour up
to 2 hours, 2.5 = more than 2 hours up to 3 hours, and
3 = more than 3 hours. (2) The number of friends, fol-
lowings and subscriptions: this item was also rated on
a three-point response format for each website, where
0 = do not use it, 1 = fewer than 50, 1.5 = 50–149,
2 = 150–299, 2.5 = 300–449, and 3 = 450 or more. And
(3) attitudinal relation to SNS: this item, which was exam-
ined by six sentences, was likewise rated on a three-point
response format for each sentence, where 1 = strongly
disagree, 1.5 = disagree, 2 = neutral, 2.5 = agree, and
3 = strongly agree. Before the overall score of this
scale was calculated, the three items were statistically
standardized, because they used different measurement
units. Based on this process, the three items were con-
verted to a z score, then a composite of z scores was com-
puted (Anglim, 2009), and finally the composite score
was converted to a scaled score (Richard, 2010, pp. 1439–
1440). Accordingly, the range of the total score of this
scale was from 1 to 19, based on which exposure to
SNS was classified into three categories: low exposure
(s < 8, 48); moderate exposure (8.48 ≤ s ≤ 11.44); and
high exposure (s > 11.44). In addition, Cronbach’s 𝛼 co-
efficient, based on the standardized items, was 0.791.
The third scale, political participation, consisted of
three different sub-scales. (1) PP aspects, which was
guided by Verba et al. (2002, pp. 544–545) and included
the following eight political activities in which respon-
dentsmight have participated in the two years preceding
the survey (June 2013–June 2015):
• Voting in the last presidential or parliamentary
elections;
• working in electoral campaigns in the last presiden-
tial or parliamentary elections;
• contacting government officials within the past
year;
• taking part in protests, strikes or sit-ins within the
past two years;
• working informally with others to solve commu-
nity problems within the past year;
• being politically active through a voluntary associ-
ation within the past two years;
• serving voluntarily in a local governmental board
regularly within the past two years; and
• being a member of, or donating to, a political orga-
nization within the past year.
Each itemwas rated on a one-point format, where 0= no
and 1 = yes. (2) Interest in local politics and affairs. And
(3) interest in national politics and affairs. These latter
two sub-scales, which were also guided by Verba et al.
(2002, p. 553), were rated on a three-point response for-
mat, where 3 = very interested, 2 = fairly interested,
1 = not very interested, and 0 = not at all interested.
The score of each sub-scale was standardized using the
same procedures that were described for the previous
scale. Consequently, the range of the total score of this
scale was from 1 to 19, based on which the levels of
PP were classified into three categories: low participa-
tion (s < 8, 5); moderate participation (8.5 ≤ s ≤ 11);
and high participation (s > 11). Cronbach’s 𝛼 coefficient,
based on the standardized items, was 0.574.
3.2. Semi-Structured Interviews
Initially, three online pilot interviews were conducted
to develop an interview protocol guide. Following this,
12 semi-structured interviews were conducted in person
in October 2015. The interviewees included four politi-
cal activists and eight political journalists (two of whom
could also be considered activists to a lesser degree).
The categories of journalists and activists were particu-
larly selected as those that were related to and informed
about media and politics. The selection of interviewees
drew mainly on a snowball sampling method, wherein
early interviewees were asked to provide referrals to
other relevant respondents (Blernackl & Waldorf, 1981,
p. 141). This method facilitated reaching respondents es-
pecially political activists who had likely been placed un-
der security surveillance.
The interview protocol guide included questions that
were planned in advance to cover major points, such as
PP developments post-25J, newspapers/SNS and PP, and
the power relations of political actors. In addition, many
further questions that emerged during the interviews
were asked as well. It is noteworthy that a few number of
newspaper clippings and SNS posts were shown to inter-
viewees in order to enrich discussion of the study topic.
All interviews, which were conducted in Arabic, were
transcribed and translated into English using NVivo
software, version 11, for Macintosh. Following this, a
grounded theory method was used for the analysis. This
method did not aim to generate a theory, but to identify
the key concepts and categories of the transcripts and to
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investigate the relationships between them. In this con-
text, the method aimed to provide an in-depth under-
standing of the relationship between newspapers/SNS
with PP and power relations over the previous six years.
The results were used to complement and interpret the
results of the quantitative phase of this study.
Data analysis was carried out in a three-step coding
process. First, open coding was conducted line by line
on all transcripts, in order to determine general points
and themes. Second, axial coding was used to combine
sets of codes in categories and sub-categories. This pro-
cess was repeated until no new categories emerged. At
this stage, all categories were constructed after their
codes and concepts were readmany times and it was cer-
tain that every category contained homogenous compo-
nents. Third, selective coding was conducted to develop
the categories and to identify core category(ies) (Corbin
& Strauss, 1990, pp. 12–15; see also Glaser & Strauss,
1967, pp. 105–107; Strauss& Corbin, 1998, pp. 101–161).
Alongside and after the coding process, many ideas were
written down in memos in order to identify the relation-
ships between themes and categories and to extract the
explicit and implicit meanings of such relationships. This
was important for eliciting and illustrating participants’
views and forming a conceptual link between them (Char-
maz, 2006, p. 72).
4. Results
4.1. Quantitative Analysis
Starting with the intensity of reading Egyptian newspa-
pers (offline and online), the results found that about
two-thirds (71%) of the respondents read newspapers,
while less than a third (29%) did not read them. Among
the readers,more than one-third (41.2%) achieved a high
level of readership, about one-third (33.1%) had a mod-
erate level, and about a quarter (25.7%) achieved a low
level. These results indicate that Egyptian youth read
newspapers in a relatively high rates; this can be ascribed
to their high exposure to the Internet, as well as to the
political polarization post-25J. With regard to PP levels,
the results found that moderate participation came in
the first place with 46.5%, followed by low participation
with 28.2% and high participation with 25.3%.
More significantly, the correlation between reading
newspapers and political participation was examined us-
ing a non-parametric test (Spearman’s rho). As shown
in Table 1, the results found a significant positive re-
lationship between the two variables (rs[284] = .131,
p = .027): as reading newspapers increases PP increases,
and as reading decreases PP decreases. These results
agree with the findings of previous studies (e.g. Bakker
& De Vreese, 2011; Fawzy, 2008; Moeller et al., 2014;
Shehata, 2010), which have found a significant relation-
ship between reading newspapers and PP. However, the
findings disagree with some other studies (e.g. Gorsche,
2002; Wang, 2002; Wright-Phillips, 2010), which have
found no such relationship between the variables.
With respect to the intensity of using SNS, the results
indicated that the vast majority of respondents (97%)
used SNS—especially Facebook, Twitter and YouTube—
while only 3%did not use them. Among the users, exactly
half of them (50%) used SNS at a moderate level, while
slightly more than a quarter (25.5%) used them at a high
level, and slightly less than a quarter (24.5%) used them
at a low level. These results indicate that a relatively large
proportion of Egyptian youthwere highly exposed to SNS
that were strong social and political platforms.
Furthermore, the correlation between SNS expo-
sure and PP was examined using a non-parametric
test (Spearman’s rho). Unexpectedly, the results found
no significant relationship between the two variables
(rs[388] = .081,	p = .111) (Table 2). The Levels of using
SNS were not associated with the levels of PP, which re-
sulted in the elimination of the effects of SNS on youth’s
PP. These results agree with the results of previous stud-
ies (e.g. Dimitrova & Bystrom, 2013; Schlozman et al.,
2010), though they disagree with the results of some
other studies (e.g. Holt et al., 2013; Kamel, 2014; Khamis
& Vaughn, 2011; Meier, 2011; Rice et al., 2012; Schuster,
2013; Valenzuela, 2013).
Comparing the relationships of both newspapers and
SNSwith youth’s PP revealed that newspapers correlated
significantly with PP, while SNS did not. The lack of a sig-
nificant relationship between SNS and PP can be ascribed
to the fact that participation was quantitatively exam-
ined for the two years preceding the questionnaire (June
2013 to June 2015), during this time period, all major po-
litical actions were undemocratic. SNS users were obvi-
Table 1. The relationship between newspaper readership and political participation.
Levels of readership Levels of PP
Spearman’s rho Levels of Correlation coefficient 1.000 .131*
readership Sig. (2-tailed) . .027*
N .284* .284*
Levels of PP Correlation coefficient .131* 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .027* .
N .284* .400*
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Table 2. The relationship between using SNS and political participation
Levels of using SNS Levels of PP
Spearman’s rho Levels of Correlation coefficient 1.000 .081
using SNS Sig. (2-tailed) . .111
N .388 .388
Levels of PP Correlation coefficient .081 1.000
Sig. (2-tailed) .111 .
N .388 .400
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
ously opposed to such actions. In contrast, the significant
relationship found between reading newspapers and PP
can be attributed to the fact that newspapers discourse
was in line with undemocratic actions, which likely en-
couraged readers to participate.
Furthermore, political affiliation was examined to de-
termine whether it yielded significant differences in PP
levels. Using the non-parametric test of Kruskal-Wallis,
the results found no significant differences between the
two variables (𝜒2 (2, N = 97) = .554, p = .758). This can
be explained by three main factors: (1) most Egyptian
youth do not tend to involve themselves in political par-
ties or movements; (2) political parties and movements
have been under government control for decades, and
are also ineffective; and (3) the recent political actions
in Egypt have been found to be connective actions (She-
hata, 2017). According to Bennett and Segerberg (2012),
most participants in connective actions tend to be unaffil-
iated, and these actions are likely moderated by commu-
nication technologies without interference from organi-
zational actors (p. 755). This helps individuals (including
youth) emerge as a political actor in the face of counter-
actors. In this way, SNS can empower political actors. This
supports Castells’ claim about the importance of mass
media and Internet-based media for practicing power
(Castells, 2009, p. 416). However, his is not an absolute
claim, because the importance of SNS or even newspa-
pers for structuring power relations and empowering po-
litical actors is contingent upon several factors, such as
government repression and media censorship. In the fol-
lowing section, the discussion will seek more evidences
to support or refute this claim.
4.2. Qualitative Analysis
The coding schemes of grounded theory yielded 803
codes, which represented the core ideas of the inter-
views transcripts. These codes were grouped into 33 cat-
egories and subcategories. Following this, twomain cate-
gorieswere emerged from the analysis: fluctuation of PP;
and power relations of political actors. Both categories
were handled in relation to newspapers and SNS over the
previous six years.
Startingwith the fluctuation of PP,most interviewees
pointed out that the youth’s participation increased dur-
ing and after 25J. This participation manifested in in-
creased involvement in political parties, entities, and civil
society organizations, and participating in protests and
elections. However, since July 3rd, 2013, PP had been
fundamentally thwarted by the governments. The lack
of participation since then was best described and ex-
plained by the prominent political activist N. Abd Al-
hamid (personal communication, October 22nd, 2015),
who told me in a despairing tone:
Youth didn’t run for elections; they didn’t participate!
You’re talkin’ about youth who have been distorted
for two years!
You’re talkin’ about the 25J that has been distorted for
two or three years!
You’re talkin’ about youth who have been excluded
from political work!
You’re talkin’ about jailed people!
So, it is normal not to have a youth participation.
4.2.1. The Effects of Newspapers/SNS on Political
Participation
Alongside the power transformations that occurred sev-
eral times in post-25J Egypt, newspapers’ attitudes to-
ward the revolution and political actors rapidly changed.
While newspapers supported the revolution and revo-
lutionary youth in the wake of Mubarak’s ouster, they
turned against the revolution after July 3rd, 2013. This
shift, as one interviewee stated, was normal in a context
in which “media career in Egypt is subjected to two lim-
itations: the extent of subordination to political author-
ity; and, in a greater degree, the capital of the media” (A.
Abdeen, personal communication, October 12th, 2015).
This result agrees with Abdulla’s study (2014), which also
ascribed this shift to the changes in newspapers’ free-
dom, which increased after 25J and declined after July
3rd, 2013.
Egyptian newspapers have suffered from both exter-
nal and internal restrictions, especially since July 3rd,
2013. Whereas the former restrictions have manifested
in security censorship, the latter restrictions have man-
ifested in the self-censorship of editors-in-chief. Under
these restrictions, many newspapers have suffered, ac-
cording to the Freedom House (2016), from confisca-
tion, banning issues, deterring writers from writing, and
the imprisonment of journalists. Such restrictions have
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forced all newspapers to adopt a pro-government edito-
rial policy, with very few exceptions, such as weak on-
line newspapers such as Bawabt Yanayer (January Gate),
Albedaya (The Beginning) and Albadil (The Alternative).
In a very significant testimony about the security in-
terference, the journalist M. Al-kholy (personal commu-
nication, October 8th, 2015) revealed, “we received here
in our newspaper a letter from the DefenseMinistry stat-
ing that ‘we’d like you not to publish any news about
Sinai [the northeastern part of Egypt in which the army is
fighting against terrorist groups] except the official state-
ments issued by the Ministry’s Department of Moral Af-
fairs’.” With regard to internal restrictions, the political
activist and journalist S. Sayed (personal communication,
October 20th, 2015), for example, talked about her per-
sonal experiment with newspapers’ internal restrictions:
I remember when I was working at Al-badil newspa-
per, I once uploaded a video and photos on Facebook
entitled “MB demonstrations”. In a very serious tone,
my head of the department shouted at me and said
“Don’t you ever write the name of MB, you must ap-
pend it with the term of terrorist group, this is an or-
der for all newspapers.”
In contrast to newspapers, SNS have been the main in-
formational andmobilizational platforms for many politi-
cal actions post-25J. In this regard, they have bridged the
gap left by the government’s control of mainstream me-
dia. However, the power transition since July 3rd, 2013
has negatively affected SNS. One such negative effect, for
example, is that the use of SNS for opposition activities
has increasingly become a case that might lead users to
prison. As one interviewee noted, “there are more than
one trial case, as published in newspapers, in which post-
ing offensive content against the armyor the countrywas
between the seizures” (M. Al-kholy, personal communi-
cation, October 8th, 2015). As a result, the political ef-
fect of SNS has declined, although their ability to spread
political awareness has increased (A. Dabbour, personal
communication, October 15th, 2015).
In addition, most interviewees noticed that SNS had
transformed from being platforms for political mobiliza-
tion to being tools for political sarcasm and the defense
of human rights. In this context, the prominent Journal-
ist T. Abo Arab (personal communication, October 7th,
2015) noted:
Now on Facebook there’re no calls for protests, tak-
ing attitudes toward elections or overthrowing some-
one, because politics is no longer existent. The alter-
native is that SNS have become focusing on human
rights and people’s issues, and they’ve turned into a
media channel that publishes what other media chan-
nels ignore.
The transformation of SNS from mobilization channels
to human rights defenders adds a new dimension to the
study of Alexander andAouragh (2014),which found that
online media are no longer primary platforms for trans-
ferring the activities and voices of specific revolutionary
groups. More importantly, the transformations in atti-
tudes of both newspapers and SNS toward PP coincided
with and followed the transfer of political authority. Con-
sequently, we can assume that the attitudes of newspa-
pers and SNS toward PP related to authority transfer.
4.2.2. The Effects of Newspapers/SNS on Power
Relations
The interviews had a special focus on the relationship of
newspapers and SNS with the power relations of politi-
cal actors post-25J. Initially, most interviewees agreed on
the major actors, which included the army, the MB, rev-
olutionary youth, remnants of the Mubarak regime, and,
to a lesser degree, political parties. The prominent po-
litical activist S. Diab (personal communication, October
23rd, 2015) classified political actors into three groups:
The political field in Egypt includes three sides: the
country, not only the army but all institutions and
those who belong to them; political Islam side, not
only the Brotherhood but all Islamic actors; and civil
side.Within every side there’re influential and uninflu-
ential actors….If two of these three sides allied against
the third, they defeat it.
Based on the effectiveness of political actors, the pre-
vious six years could be divided, according to most in-
terviewees, into three chronological stages: (1) from
Mubarak’s ouster on February 11th, 2011 to the begin-
ning of 2012, when revolutionary youth, liberal actors,
and leftist actors were a striking force in political ac-
tivism; (2) from the beginning of 2012 to June 2013,
when Islamic actors—including the MB and the Salafis—
were a leading force in parliament and the presidency;
and (3) after Morsi’s ouster on July 3rd, 2013, when the
army, remnants of the Mubarak regime, and business
elite controlled all of the country’s institutions.
Although it had only been a short period since the
eruption of the revolution, political authority had been
transferred several times, and with each transfer, the
landscape of political coalitions and conflicts profoundly
changed. During the revolution, a very short-term and
spontaneous political coalition was formed between the
revolutionary youth and the MB. This coalition cracked
in March 2011, when the Brotherhood entered into an
implicit coalition with the army. This new coalition com-
pletely broke down on June 30th, 2013, when the army
joined a new coalitionwith the remnants of theMubarak
regime and a large portion of the civil forces and business
elite. This latter new coalition managed to oust the MB
from power on July 3rd, 2013, and following this, it mas-
sively repressed theMBand turned against revolutionary
youth. Consequently, the three main actors (the army,
the MB, and revolutionary youth) became separate and
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strongly conflicted. Accordingly, it can be said that the
development of political relationships constructed the
power and counter-power of political actors. In other
words, political coalitions enabled allied actors to exert
power over other actors. This analysis supports one of
Castells’ central claims that considers power as relation-
ships between actors (Castells, 2009, p. 10).
Newspapers and SNS were indeed platforms upon
which conflict and cooperation relationships were cen-
tered. On the one hand, newspaper ownership played a
crucial role in shaping political discourse and affecting PP
activities. According to the prominent activist I. Abd Al-
fatah, newspapers that are owned or controlled by ma-
jor political actors spark conflict relationships. While the
army has almost controlled all types of newspapers, the
MB-owned Alhoriya Wa Aladala (The Freedom and Jus-
tice), and the revolutionary youth have worked at some
newspapers, through which they have expressed their
views (I. Abd Al-fatah, personal communication, October
10th, 2015).
In addition, as most newspapers have been con-
trolled by anti-revolution actors (the army, remnants
of the Mubarak regime, and the business elite), their
attitudes have been very negative toward the revolu-
tionary youth and protest activities. This consequently
has, as noted by M. Al-kholy (personal communica-
tion, October 8th, 2015), negatively affected newspa-
pers’ credibility for citizens, who no longer trust them.
These results agree with those of some studies (e.g. Al-
Maskati, 2012; Hamdy & Gomaa, 2012; Ibrahim, 2012;
Youssef, 2012), which have found that newspapers have
adopted negative attitudes toward protestors and partic-
ipation activities.
On the other hand, SNS have been key tools for politi-
cal information andmobilization. Revolutionary youth, in
particular, have been superior in using them to organize
protest activities. However other political actors have
started to use SNS for counter-mobilization and shap-
ing public opinion. In this context, T. Abo Arab (personal
communication, October 7th, 2015) stated:
Primarily, before the 25J, Facebook was mostly used
by liberal activists, while the MB and the army were
out of it. Straight after the revolution, the MB, fol-
lowed by the army, started to use it intensively. The
conflict between the MB and the army, therefore,
moved to SNS. Both of the actors have had electronic
teams that rivalled revolutionary youth online.
Going back to the argument of the inability of SNS to em-
power revolutionary youth in the long run, we can say,
in light of this analysis, that SNS enabled the youth to
transfer their voices, to provide different narratives of
political actions, and to mobilize people for protests. As
an emerging political actor, revolutionary youth could do
this when they were the main users of SNS, which were
also more free. But these conditions changed, and the
ability of SNS to empower youth was affected by at least
four determinants: access of other actors to SNS, the gov-
ernment’s censorship of SNS, the government’s control
of mainstreammedia, and the political repression follow-
ing July 3rd, 2013. As a consequence, the ability of SNS
to give rise to revolutionary youth has considerably de-
clined, leaving its ability to empower them in the long
run very much in doubt.
This analysis disagrees with the results of some stud-
ies (e.g. Alexander&Aouragh, 2014, p. 892;Meier, 2011),
which have shown that the Internet has shifted the
power balance in favor of pro-revolution actors in Egypt.
However, this does not necessarily mean that SNS have
not been important for new political actors. Indeed, SNS
and the Internet have been essential for playing, at least,
two other roles: increasing tensions within the overall
structure of power (Curran, 2002, p. 65) and making
power (Castells, 2009, p. 416). These roles have not been
maintained or translated into long-term empowerment
by revolutionary youth.
5. Discussion
The quantitative analysis found that newspapers, but not
SNS, related significantly with PP. The qualitative anal-
ysis supported these results and further indicated that
both SNS and newspapers were crucial platforms for po-
litical actors, who were involved in a series of conflicts
and coalitions over the last six years. While SNS gave rise
to pro-revolution actors (especially revolutionary youth)
and enabled them to topple Mubarak on February 11th,
2011, newspapers and other mainstreammedia enabled
anti-revolution actors (especially the army) to restore au-
thority on July 3rd, 2013. Thus, it can be said that SNS
were not sufficient to empower the emergent force of
revolutionary youth in the long-run in the face of anti-
revolution actors.
The main reasons why the empowerment of revolu-
tionary youthwas obstructed, despite their strong access
to SNS, are that anti-revolution actors controlled allmain-
stream media and practiced massive repression against
opposition forces, and that SNS increasingly became
available for anti-revolution actors (see, e.g., Castells,
2009, p. 414; Fenton, 2016, p. 176). These factors even-
tually led the anti-revolution actors to outweigh the rev-
olutionary youth. Here, we can say that all aspects of the
obstruction of PP by political regimes after July 3rd, 2013
undermined the emergence of new political actors and,
at the same time, impaired the power of both revolu-
tionary youth and the MB. Thus, it is reasonable to con-
sider SNS a space for—not a holder of—power (Castells,
2007, p. 242). Nevertheless, this does not negate the im-
portance of SNS and new political actors for the alter-
ation of staging power relationships and decisionmaking
(Castells, 2009, p. 412; Curran, 2002, p. 65).
Furthermore, the quantitative analysis showed that
Egyptian youth used newspapers and SNS in relatively
high rates, and the qualitative analysis pointed out that
political actors have overused both channels. Newspa-
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pers were exploited, especially by the army, for fighting
political battles against opposition forces. As a result, the
political discourse of newspapers became highly politi-
cized and biased, and this consequently affected their
credibility. In contrast, SNS were overused, especially by
revolutionary youth, as a counter-platform for informa-
tion and mobilization purposes. Many aspects of PP also
shifted and were practiced through SNS. Especially right
after the revolution, this made the logic of SNS more
prevalent than the logic of political actions, which could
be considered a type of mediatization of politics.
6. Conclusion
This article investigated the effects of newspapers and
SNS on the political participation of youth and the power
relations of political actors in Egypt following the 2011
revolution. In this context, I argued that SNS cannot, in
the long run, empower new political actors, especially if
newspapers and other mainstream media are under the
control of old actors. In order to empirically validate this
argument, a survey was applied on a sample of Egyptian
youth and semi-structured interviews were conducted
with a number of political activists and journalists.
The results found that newspapers, but not SNS, sig-
nificantly related with youth’s political participation. It
was also found that both newspapers and SNS were de-
cisive platforms for enabling pro- and anti-revolution ac-
tors, as powers and counter-powers, to achieve interim
political goals. Both anti-revolution actors (supported by
newspapers) and pro-revolution actors (supported by
SNS) were involved in a series of cooperation and con-
flict relationships, which eventually ended up favoring
the anti-revolution actors. Thus, SNS were not sufficient
to empower revolutionary youth as a new political actor
in the face of anti-revolution actors, primarily due to SNS
censorship and political repression.
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